

APPEAL NO. 020412
FILED APRIL 11, 2002

This appeal arises pursuant to the Texas Workers' Compensation Act, TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 401.001 *et seq.* (1989 Act). A contested case hearing was held on January 29, 2002. The issue before her was whether the appellant (claimant herein) had disability from May 9, 2000, to June 13, 2001. The hearing officer resolves this issue by concluding that the claimant had disability on June 20, 2000; on June 22, 2000; on August 7, 2000; on August 17, 2000; and has had disability since April 6, 2001. The claimant appeals, contending that the hearing officer's decision is contrary to the evidence. The respondent (carrier herein) replies that there was sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer.

DECISION

Finding sufficient evidence to support the decision of the hearing officer and no reversible error in the record, we affirm the decision and order of the hearing officer.

The claimant contends that her testimony and medical evidence established that she had disability from May 9, 2000, until June 13, 2001. The carrier argues that the evidence concerning disability was conflicting and that the hearing officer could weigh the evidence to reach the result which she did.

Disability is a question of fact to be determined by the hearing officer. Texas Workers' Compensation Commission Appeal No. 93560, decided August 19, 1993. Section 410.165(a) provides that the contested case hearing officer, as finder of fact, is the sole judge of the relevance and materiality of the evidence as well as of the weight and credibility that is to be given the evidence. It was for the hearing officer, as trier of fact, to resolve the inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence. Garza v. Commercial Insurance Company of Newark, New Jersey, 508 S.W.2d 701, 702 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). This is equally true regarding medical evidence. Texas Employers Insurance Association v. Campos, 666 S.W.2d 286, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ). The trier of fact may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness. Taylor v. Lewis, 553 S.W.2d 153, 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Aetna Insurance Co. v. English, 204 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1947, no writ). An appeals-level body is not a fact finder and does not normally pass upon the credibility of witnesses or substitute its own judgment for that of the trier of fact, even if the evidence would support a different result. National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania v. Soto, 819 S.W.2d 619, 620 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied). When reviewing a hearing officer's decision for factual sufficiency of the evidence we should reverse such decision only if it is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986). This is so even though another fact finder might have drawn other inferences and reached other conclusions. Salazar, et al. v. Hill, 551 S.W.2d 518 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Applying this

standard, we do not find a basis to reverse the decision of the hearing officer.

The decision and order of the hearing officer are affirmed.

The true corporate name of the insurance carrier is **TEXAS PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE GUARANTY ASSOCIATION for United Pacific Insurance Company, a subsidiary of Reliance National Indemnity Company, an impaired carrier** and the name and address of the registered agent for service of process is

**MARVIN KELLY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
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Gary L. Kilgore
Appeals Judge

CONCUR:

Terri Kay Oliver
Appeals Judge

Philip F. O'Neill
Appeals Judge